The Obama management has finished its third appraisal in two years of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. It quarrel the current move toward is making progress, with achievement defined as building up Afghan national army and police forces until they can hold their own alongside a Taliban that is being weakened by continuing combat. Some officials also believe that quite a few more years of military heaviness will persuade many Taliban fighters to switch sides somewhat than fight.
There is good reason to be skeptical. While the situation on the ground in Afghanistan should improve in areas where U.S. military forces are in commission in strength, the gains are likely to fade in the wake of their going away. The intrinsic weakness of central government institutions in Afghanistan, the tenacity of the Taliban and their ties to Afghanistan's many Pashtuns, and the actuality that the Taliban will keep on to take pleasure in a sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan all work touching what we seek to achieve.
It is probable that doubters will be established wrong. But the more primary problem with the policy depends less on its prospects than its costs and reimbursement. What the United States is doing in Afghanistan is not necessary even if the policy succeed.
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